International by Picciotto, Sol
The landscape of international corporate 
taxation will change significantly as a result 
of the G20/OECD project on base erosion 
and profit shifting (BEPS). The contours 
of this new terrain have become apparent 
since the publication of the main outputs 
of the project in October 2015. The BEPS 
outputs aim to strengthen the system and 
give better tools to tax authorities – if they 
have the capacity and will to use them. 
Overall, however, the proposals are a 
patch-up of existing rules, making them even 
more complex and dependent on technical 
expertise to administer. They do not tackle 
the more fundamental flaws of the system 
in a coherent way, but are an important first 
step on a longer road. It is therefore very 
important for African countries to inform 
themselves about the implications of the 
BEPS proposals, and to form their own 
views on which aspects may benefit them.
The G20 project itself is continuing, both to 
supervise and coordinate implementation 
and to work on some key issues that were 
not dealt with in its main phase. In February 
2016 an Inclusive Framework was 
established, allowing any country to join the 
process as a BEPS Associate. This has 
turned the OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs into a global tax body for some 
purposes, holding its first meeting in this 
form in Japan in June 2016. Countries that 
join are expected to implement the minimum 
BEPS project commitments, but can also be 
involved in the continuing standard-setting. 
However, the OECD countries have set the 
scope of the project, which explicitly 
excluded any reconsideration of the 
allocation of taxing rights between residence 
and source countries. In practice the issue is 
hard to avoid, especially as many OECD 
countries have experienced the difficulty of 
taxing foreign-based internet companies and 
service providers. Inevitably, the BEPS 
discussions and negotiations have been 
dominated by the concerns of the large 
countries that are home to multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). It remains to be seen 
whether increasing the number of 
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governments involved in the BEPS process to 
100 will lead to any rebalancing of the 
perspective.
The mandate from the G20 leaders for the BEPS 
project was to reform international tax rules 
to ensure that MNEs could be taxed ‘where 
economic activities occur and value is created’. 
However, they also added ‘while respecting the 
sovereignty of each country to design its own 
rules’. These aims are contradictory. Ensuring 
that taxation is in line with economic substance 
requires stronger coordination between states. 
This inevitably restricts the freedom of states, 
although it is the only way to restore their 
effective power to tax MNEs. 
This brief begins by outlining the central flaw in the 
current system for taxing MNEs – its ambivalence 
between understanding their economic nature 
as unitary businesses, and taxing their national 
operations as if they were independent of each 
other. It then surveys the outcomes of the BEPS 
project, to show how their strengthening the rules 
has also sharpened this ambivalence. The third 
section sketches out the three main alternative 
approaches that have been proposed for moving 
to a unitary approach. The concluding section 
briefly discusses the prospects for the immediate 
post-BEPS project period, which it is suggested 
will be essentially a transitional one.
The Ambivalence of 
International Tax Rules 
towards MNEs
Since they were first formulated almost a 
century ago, international tax rules have 
retained an ambivalence – which is a 
fundamental flaw. The basic principle, which 
allocated the right to tax active business income 
to the source country and passive investment 
income to the investor’s country of residence, 
was aimed at portfolio investment – then the 
dominant form. It was already understood, 
however, that foreign direct investment by 
MNEs posed special problems, since it was 
hard to determine the appropriate level of profits 
attributable to the various affiliates (branches or 
subsidiaries) of a multinational corporate group. 
It is well known that this was addressed by a 
study for the League of Nations, resulting in the 
voluminous report coordinated by Mitchell B. 
Carroll.1 Carroll summarised the issue as follows:
The tax official in each country where there 
is an establishment has at his immediate 
disposal only the accounts (if any) of the local 
establishment, and it is necessary for him 
to ascertain whether or not they reflect the 
true profit attributable to that establishment. 
Obviously, his task is easy if the local 
establishment is virtually self-contained or is 
an autonomous unit which is treated as such 
by the foreign enterprise, or if the foreign 
enterprise has dealt with each establishment 
at arm’s length as if it were an independent 
enterprise. This entails, in some cases, allotting 
to it the capital normally required to carry on 
its activities, and, in every case, billing to it or 
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1 For further details and discussion, see Picciotto, S. (1992) International Business Taxation, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, available at 
http://taxjustice.blogspot.be/2013/06/international-business-taxation.html
Ensuring that taxation is 
in line with economic 
substance requires stronger 
coordination between 
states. This inevitably 
restricts the freedom of 
states, although it is the only 
way to restore their effective 
power to tax MNEs.
making charges at the same rates as it would 
to an outsider. Unfortunately, however, the local 
establishment is not so treated by the great 
majority of enterprises, and the tax inspector 
finds it necessary to adjust the accounts after 
securing whatever additional information is 
available or to make an assessment on an 
empirical or fractional basis.2
The result was the inclusion in the model tax 
treaty of the power in Article 9 to adjust the 
accounts of associated enterprises, to prevent 
diversion of profits. The Carroll report showed 
that tax authorities at that time used two main 
approaches. One was to use empirical methods 
to compare the profits of associated enterprises 
of MNEs with those of similar independent firms. 
The other, used especially when comparable 
businesses could not be found, was to treat the 
enterprise as an organic unity, and apportion 
the total profits on a fractional basis, using an 
appropriate factor such as turnover. The use 
of the fractional method was explicitly included 
for permanent establishments in Article 7 of the 
model, and this provision remains today in many 
treaties, especially of developing countries.3
Hence, the tax treaty provisions were ambivalent 
about how to treat MNEs. On the one hand, 
they gave tax authorities powers to adjust the 
accounts of associated enterprises, based on the 
understanding that they are related parties under 
unified control. On the other hand, the principle 
to be applied was that the income should reflect 
what might be expected if the entities were 
independent. Consequently, the system, as it has 
developed historically, has included both unitary 
and independent entity elements.
This provided a perverse incentive, which MNEs 
have increasingly exploited to minimise their 
taxes. Since the 1930s, and increasingly from 
the 1950s, they began to form intermediary 
entities to hold assets and shift profits through 
conduits to base companies, creating the tax 
haven and offshore secrecy system.4 Today, 
most MNEs typically consist of often hundreds of 
affiliates, forming complex corporate groups. The 
shift to the knowledge economy and digitalisation 
has further facilitated the restructuring of MNE 
operations around global value chains, which can 
be tax-driven. This enables the fragmentation of 
different functions (research, design, assembly, 
marketing, distribution) as well as management 
and back office activities. The independent entity 
principle enables MNEs to attribute only routine 
levels of profit to entities in high-tax countries, 
while channelling large revenues for payments 
for intangibles, finance and fees to low-taxed 
affiliates. Countries now compete to offer tax 
advantages to attract the location of entities that 
perform such high value-adding functions.
The measures adopted by tax authorities to 
counteract these strategies have continued to 
remain ambivalent. Some provisions override the 
fiction of separate entity, such as rules allowing 
taxation of the undistributed income of a controlled 
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2 Carroll, M. (1933: 12 para 6) Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises. Volume 4: Methods of Allocating Taxable 
Income, Geneva: League of Nations, available at http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/pubotbin/toccer-new?id=cartaxa.
sgml&tag=law&images=acdp/gifs&data=/usr/ot&part=0
3 Avi-Yonah, R. and Pouga Tinhaga, Z. (2015) Unitary Taxation and International Tax Rules, ICTD Working Paper 26, available at 
http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/taxation/ICTD-WP26.pdf
4 The US first referred the problem to the OECD soon after the establishment of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, which in 1962 set 
up Working Party 21 on Tax Avoidance Through the Improper Use or Abuse of Tax Conventions, consisting of Denmark and the 
US. Although its work was secret at the time, the records have recently become easily available through the Tax Treaties History 
project: http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/. Its investigations focused on the question of ‘how a country may prevent taxpayers 
domiciled within its borders from artificially avoiding tax by placing their sources of income outside the borders of the country’; see 
Preliminary Report on the Improper Use or Abuse of Tax Treaties, Fiscal Committee Working Party 21, 9 January 1963, FC/WP21 
(63) 1 (Paris, OECD). In 1964, Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury for Tax Policy from 1961-69, again wrote to 
the OECD proposing work to agree guidelines on transfer pricing, but this was not done at that time.
foreign corporation (CFC) as part of the tax base 
of its parent, first introduced by the US in 1962. 
Others, particularly the rules on transfer pricing, 
have increasingly emphasised the independent 
entity principle. When the US introduced its 
more detailed Transfer Pricing Regulations in 
1968, they focused on the pricing of inter-affiliate 
transactions, and gave priority to the Comparable 
Uncontrolled Price (CUP) method. This approach 
failed as suitable comparables could not be found, 
for the very good reason that MNEs benefit from 
the advantages of scale and scope, and the 
synergy resulting from their integrated operations. 
The introduction by the US of the comparable 
profit method led to a conflict at the OECD. This 
was eventually resolved by the inclusion of two 
new methods in the OECD’s 1995 Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines (TPGs), the transactional net margin 
method (TNMM) and profit split.5 They have been 
labelled transactional profit methods, in an effort 
to maintain the fiction of independent entity.
The mandate for the BEPS project implied that 
MNEs should be treated in accordance with the 
business reality that they operate as single firms. 
Although the final BEPS project proposals did not 
accept this explicitly, in some respects they did move 
in that direction. However, on the crucial question 
of criteria for allocating profits, the proposals 
remained unclear and complex. Hence, although 
they open up a new road for the international tax 
system, the direction of travel is uncertain. 
The BEPS Project 
Outcomes
In some respects the BEPS project reports do 
move towards treating MNEs as unitary firms. 
The requirement for country-by-country reporting 
for the largest MNEs, together with standardised 
templates for a master file and local file for 
transfer pricing documentation, will for the first 
time make it possible for all tax authorities to 
have a clear view of the firm as a whole, and the 
relationship of its various parts. 
The adoption of an apportionment approach 
was easier for costs, since MNEs themselves 
would like a guarantee that they can be 
deducted somewhere. However, the adoption 
of a simplified method for pooling and allocating 
central service costs within a corporate group 
has been limited to low value-adding services,6 
because many tax authorities rightly consider 
that such deductions can be used to reduce 
the source country tax base. An important 
departure from the independent entity principle 
came in the proposals on limitation of interest 
deductions. The initial draft suggested a 
limit based on apportioning the group’s 
consolidated net costs of interest paid to third 
parties by the MNE as a whole, in proportion 
to each affiliate’s earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). This 
was explicitly presented as not-an-arm’s-length 
rule.7 However, the final report recommended 
a fixed cap of between 10 and 30 per cent of 
EBITDA, although combined with a group ratio 
rule, at the taxpayer’s option. This is clearly 
ineffective, since data submitted by business 
groups themselves showed that over half 
of non-financial MNEs had net consolidated 
interest expense below 10 per cent of EBITDA, 
and around 80 per cent had a ratio below 30 
per cent.8 The recommended fixed cap will 
clearly allow most MNEs to continue to deduct 
excessive interest. Nevertheless, a fixed 
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Transfer Pricing Today’, NYU Tax Law Review 57: 37-136.
6 Through revisions to chapter VII of the TPGs in the BEPS Report on Actions 8-10.
7 Discussion draft on Action 4, December 2014, paras. 21-24.
8 See the survey done by PwC for the Business and Industry Advisory Group of the OECD: Comments received on Public 
Discussion Draft BEPS Action 4: Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Part 1, p.136, available at http://www.oecd.
org/tax/public-comments-action-4-interest-deductions-other-financial-payments.htm
cap is an improvement on thin capitalisation 
rules – these are still widely used in developing 
countries, but are largely ineffective.
The greatest reluctance to abandon the 
independent entity principle is seen when it 
comes to the allocation of profits. The report on 
BEPS Actions 8-10 has resulted in a substantial 
rewriting of the OECD’s TPGs – these are 
important because they are applied in practice 
in countries around the world, and not only 
by OECD members. Indeed, most African 
countries have in recent years introduced 
transfer pricing rules that are either explicitly or 
implicitly based on the OECD’s TPGs. In Kenya 
this was precipitated by a court decision in the 
Unilever case (2003), in which Judge Alnashir 
Visram rejected transfer price adjustments 
made by the Kenya Revenue Authority, even 
though they were based on the comparable 
uncontrolled price method, on the grounds that 
the taxpayer was entitled to rely on any method 
in the OECD Guidelines, although the Kenyan 
legislation at that time made no reference to 
them.9 Consequently, Kenya enacted Transfer 
Pricing Regulations in 2006 adopting the OECD’s 
five methods, although they also allow for the 
Commissioner to specify a different method. 
In some countries the OECD TPGs are given 
statutory status to be used as guidance for tax 
treaty interpretation, although along with the 
UN Manual on Transfer Pricing.10 Others have 
simply enacted rules specifying the OECD 
methods – for example, Madagascar in 2014.11 
It remains to be seen whether, and if so how, 
African countries introduce the changes to the 
TPGs agreed in the BEPS project. The OECD 
Council has agreed these changes, so they are 
regarded as applicable in OECD countries, and a 
version incorporating the changes is likely to be 
issued in 2016.
Despite the revisions, the TPGs still stress that 
the starting point should be the various entities in 
the MNE group and the transactions between 
them. There is nevertheless a significant 
reorientation of the rules, with a new emphasis 
on accurately delineating the true nature of these 
transactions, based on an analysis of the facts 
and circumstances of each business. This ‘requires 
a broad-based understanding of the industry 
sector in which the MNE group operates ... 
including its business strategies, markets, 
products, its supply chain, and the key functions 
performed, material assets used, and important 
risks assumed’.12
The difficulties posed by this procedure should 
be readily apparent. Tax authorities must carry 
out individual audits of firms, analysing the firm’s 
group structure and business model, which 
requires specialist knowledge of each type of 
business. The F-A-R (functions-assets-risk) 
analysis in the revised TPGs is now elaborated in 
greater detail, especially as regards the functions 
relating to intangibles and to risks. A key intention 
is to ensure that an affiliate that is used simply 
as a cash box, either for owning and receiving 
income from intangibles, or for group financing, 
should receive only a risk-free return. 
The aim of functional analysis is to try to identify 
the specific functions performed by different 
affiliates. In practice this is difficult or impossible 
when it comes to knowledge-based intangibles 
or risk, both of which are spread through the firm 
as a whole. Although this flows from the basic 
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10 e.g. the Nigerian Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Regulations No. 1 of 2012, and the Tanzanian Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) 
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12 New para. 1.34 in chapter 1 section D of the TPGs.
theory of the firm, it is also borne out in practice. 
As a submission by BASF, the German-based 
chemicals firm, explained:
Quality management and controls relating to 
the risks, functions and assets employed are 
to a wide extent part of corporate procedures 
which are generally valid group-wide and are 
fully integrated in the business processes. 
The research and development process 
is managed by electronic systems which 
track the allocation of projects to specific 
research centres, the adherence to budgets, 
the sign-off processes and the registration 
of IP rights. “Control” is therefore to a large 
extent built in to group-wide guidelines and 
operating systems, and can therefore be 
performed anywhere as such systems enable 
a decentralised, collaborative organisation.13
Indeed, MNEs pride themselves on being 
both global and local, able to benefit from their 
coordination of activities worldwide, while their 
central management teams may be relatively small.
The revised TPGs place significant emphasis on 
control functions. In relation to intangibles they 
identify the especially important functions as 
design and control, direction of and establishing 
priority, and management and control (revised 
TPGs para. 6.56). Similarly, for identifying the 
location of risk the key test is the ‘capability and 
authority to control’ (para. 1.67). 
This control test for the location of key functions 
clearly favours countries of residence. It is likely 
that countries where the corporate headquarters, 
chief financial officer, or main research centre are 
located will assert that the control over functions 
such as finance and research is exercised there, 
even if the firm operates in a decentralised way. 
Hence, an MNE could employ large numbers of 
people in research and development activities in 
affiliates around the world that could be treated 
as having only routine research functions, to 
which relatively low profits would be attributable.14 
At the same time, the aim to end tax avoidance 
by attribution of profits to cash box affiliates may 
have limited success. A company could relocate 
a few senior people to carry out control functions 
in a country that offers low effective tax rates 
for such activities. Indeed, countries are already 
competing to attract research hubs by offering low 
tax rates on structures such as the ‘patent box’. 
The attempt by some developing country 
members of the G20 to strengthen the claims of 
source countries achieved limited success, in the 
inclusion of some revisions to refer to location 
advantages, and assembled workforce (revised 
TPGs Chapter 1, sections D.6 and D.7), but 
these provisions are worded very cautiously. The 
result is that MNEs can continue to treat their 
affiliates in developing countries, such as those 
in Africa, as adding little value even if they have 
substantial activities – on the grounds that they 
do not control the key functions of managing 
risk or intangibles. Under the OECD approach to 
transfer pricing they can continue to allow only 
routine levels of profit to these affiliates, based 
on the cost plus or TNMM methods.
Alternative Approaches
Several alternative approaches are available that 
involve treating transnational corporate groups 
as unitary firms. Indeed, as already discussed 
above, the existing rules already include unitary 
elements. Hence, some of these approaches 
could be compatible with current rules.
Residence-based Worldwide Taxation 
(RBWT)
Residence-based worldwide taxation would 
apply home country tax directly on a current 
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14 BASF in its evidence cited in the previous footnote stated that it has ‘numerous research hubs, located primarily in Germany, 
USA, China and India’. 
basis on the consolidated worldwide profits of a 
corporate group, but with a full credit for foreign 
taxes paid.15 This would in effect treat all foreign 
affiliates on a full-inclusion basis as Controlled 
Foreign Corporations (CFCs). RBWT gives the 
residual right to tax to the firm’s home country, 
but the initial right to the source country. Hence, 
it can be seen as strengthening source country 
taxation by removing the incentive for the MNE 
to shift profits, since any reduction of source 
taxation would lead to an equivalent increase of 
tax in the home country. For the same reason, 
it also removes the temptation for the source 
country to offer tax advantages to attract inward 
investment. 
Such provisions could, from a legal perspective, 
be formulated and implemented unilaterally, 
without the need for agreement between states, 
and probably also without alterations to tax 
treaty rules. Indeed, strengthening of CFC 
rules was Action 3 in the BEPS project, but the 
final proposals were very weak. In practice its 
unilateral adoption is difficult, especially for a 
country with a high corporate tax rate, due to 
the risk of relocation or inversion of the group 
headquarters. This could be counteracted 
legally, through appropriate residence rules. 
However, as many have argued, corporate 
residence is increasingly hard to define. Place of 
incorporation is obviously ineffective, and place 
of central management may also be prone to 
avoidance, since it involves identifying where 
key central management decisions are taken. 
Some opt for a test of shareholder residency 
combined with a rebuttable presumption 
for place of incorporation, arguing that this 
information should be increasingly available ‘in 
a post-FATCA world’.16
A shift towards RBWT would also be facilitated 
if a more coordinated approach could be 
developed, despite the failure to do so in the 
BEPS project. Adoption of RBWT by both 
the US and the EU could make the approach 
effective – although there should be some 
coordination, which would be hard to achieve. 
The BRICS countries are now also the home of 
large MNEs, and could be potential adopters of 
RBWT. However, in the present climate there 
seems little appetite for such coordination. The 
draft Anti-Tax-Avoidance Directive published 
by the European Commission in January 2016 
included common CFC rules, but aimed only at 
defined types of passive income, and confined to 
entities in non-European countries with very low 
tax rates (a threshold of 40 per cent of the home 
country rate). This has subsequently been further 
weakened, and a highly attenuated CFC rule 
was included in the Directive that was adopted in 
June 2016.
Destination-based Cash Flow Tax 
(DBCFT)
A Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax has been 
advocated, especially by some economists.17 
A pure DBCFT is not a tax on profits, but 
akin to a value added tax (VAT), except that 
www.ictd.ac
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15 This has been advocated by a number of US-based commentators, see especially Kleinbard, E. (2011) ‘The Lessons of 
Stateless Income’, Tax Law Review, available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1791783; Kadet, J. (2013) ‘Worldwide Tax Reform: 
Reversing The Race to the Bottom’, Tax Notes International 69: 1133-6; Fleming Jr., J., Peroni, R. and Shay, S. (2014) ‘Formulary 
Apportionment in the U.S. International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig’, Michigan Jl. Intl Law 36: 1-57; Avi-Yonah, 
R. (2016) ‘Hanging Together: A Multilateral Approach to Taxing Multinationals’ in T. Pogge and K. Mehta (eds.), Global Tax 
Fairness, Oxford University Press.
16 Fleming et al. (op. cit: 22). This refers to the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 2010, which required reporting of 
non-resident recipients of interest payments. The BEPS Action 3 report on CFC rules discusses how to define a CFC, suggesting 
a combination of legal and economic control tests, but does not address the question of how to define the ultimate parent.
17 Auerbach, A. and Devereux, M. (2013) Consumption and Cash-Flow Taxes in an International Setting, NBER Working Paper 
No. 19579, http://www.nber.org/papers/w19579. It has also been proposed by the Republican majority in the House Ways and 
Means Committee of the US Congress: see A Better Way. Blueprint for Tax Reform (2016), available at https://waysandmeans.
house.gov/taxreform/
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full and immediate deduction is allowed both 
of labour costs and other cash expenses 
including investments. Applied on a destination 
basis it could therefore be regarded as trade 
distorting, and hence conflict with world trade 
rules. Nevertheless, from the perspective of 
international tax rules,18 this approach has the 
merit that it is in effect a unitary approach, since 
internal transfers within a corporate group are 
ignored, and the tax base is both defined and 
apportioned in terms of sales to third parties. 
Allocating the corporate tax base according 
to the location of final consumers may have 
economic attractions. Notably, corporations could 
make investment and employment decisions 
without being affected by the varying tax rates 
of the jurisdictions where the investments would 
be made or workers are employed. On the other 
hand, it raises concerns about the distributional 
effects on tax revenue for countries with 
relatively small consumer markets (discussed 
further below). 
It also raises considerable practical problems. 
First, it requires identification of the location 
of customers, which is difficult in the era of 
electronic commerce. However, some solutions 
are being developed to enable the effective 
collection of VAT on cross-border sales in the 
country of residence of the consumer, by both 
the EU and the OECD. The report on BEPS 
Action 1 suggested the possibility of enforcement 
through intermediaries such as banks. This 
would require foreign firms to register, and 
maintain identifiable accounts, payments into 
which would be taxed. This mechanism could 
be used either for a sales transaction tax, or 
for a withholding tax on sales credited against 
a corporate income tax liability. A stronger 
objection is that a high proportion of exports 
consist of sales of intermediate goods to 
businesses, and not finished products to final 
consumers. This could encourage the location of 
assembly industries, and purchasers of capital 
goods (such as aircraft leasing companies), in 
countries with low corporate income tax rates.19
Another major problem is that, since it apportions 
income based entirely on sales, the DBCFT 
brings into sharp relief the problem that taxing 
rights could be allocated to countries where a 
company has little or no physical presence. To 
deal with this a clearing house system has been 
proposed, modelled on the one-stop-shop being 
trialled in the EU to enable VAT to move to a 
destination basis. However, this would entail 
considerable cooperation among states, in effect 
a joint system of collection and enforcement of 
corporate taxes, with a netting out procedure, 
including an element for the costs of collection.20 
In view of the experience to date of attempting to 
reach agreement between states, this seems to 
be an extremely ambitious undertaking.
Unitary Taxation with Formulary 
Apportionment (UTWFA)
Unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is 
probably the most radical alternative. This has 
long been advocated by a variety of independent 
commentators. It would have the enormous 
advantage of providing a comprehensive 
approach, not only replacing the complex and 
subjective transfer pricing and source-of-income 
rules, but also dispensing with the need for most 
of the other elaborate anti-avoidance rules, 
such as anti-hybrid provisions and limitations on 
deductions. It is not a panacea, however, nor 
could it be introduced in the short term. Research 
18 Cui, W. (2015: 21-3) Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation: A Critical Appraisal, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2614780
19 Grubert, H. (2015, 53-58) ‘Destination-Based Income Taxes: A Mismatch Made in Heaven?’ Tax Law Review 69: 43-72, who 
also compares different versions of the DBCFT with formulary apportionment.
20 Devereux, M. and de la Feria, R. (2014: 21) Designing and Implementing a Destination-Based Corporate Tax OUCBT Working 
Paper 14/07.
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is needed on its main elements, especially the 
definition of the consolidated tax base, and 
the implications of the choice of factors for 
the apportionment formula. Some work has 
recently been published resulting from research 
supported by ICTD, which particularly aimed to 
investigate the implications of this approach for 
developing countries.21 There is no space here 
to evaluate UTWFA in any detail.22 However, a 
few comments can be made in response to some 
of the objections that have been made to this 
approach. 
It is often argued that it would be impossible to 
reach political agreement on the apportionment 
formula, and that without such agreement 
there would be an unacceptable level of double 
taxation. A related argument is that unitary 
taxation would not end tax competition between 
states, or tax planning by companies, but shift 
them onto new ground. However, these overlook 
the point that, in choosing a suitable formula, 
states would need to take into account not only 
the tax revenue it would produce, but also the 
likely effect on their ability to attract foreign 
direct investment, which are interacting factors. 
Since firms would have an incentive to shift 
labour-intensive activities away from countries 
that emphasise labour in the apportionment 
factors, states would need to balance the effects 
of the formula on tax revenue with those on 
investment.23 The incentive effects on both 
national tax policies and corporate strategies 
could therefore be mutually supportive, and 
potentially benign. 
Unlike the situation under current international 
tax rules, these decisions would concern real 
and not paper activities. This has important 
implications. It means that this revenue-
investment trade-off would create a basis for 
convergence or agreement between states in 
the choice of apportionment factors, and that 
this choice is not a zero-sum game. States 
with a labour-intensive economy would not 
necessarily choose a high labour weighting in the 
apportionment formula, for fear of driving away 
investment, and discouraging investment to 
improve productivity. Hence, even in the absence 
of agreement on the apportionment formula, 
double taxation is unlikely to result.24 
There is perhaps a bigger danger of double 
non-taxation, unless states can learn from 
experience – notably in the US, where states 
have shifted towards a sales weighting, aiming to 
encourage investment for production and hence 
increase employment in the state. However, 
this has ceased to have a significant effect over 
a longer period, as competitor states adopt 
similar policies.25 It should also be borne in 
mind that the DBCFT would allocate the entire 
tax base to the country of destination of sales. 
A sales-only formula could still be a concern 
for developing countries, where much inward 
investment involves production or extraction for 
export without significant local sales. However, 
they are also significant importers of goods, and 
especially services, from MNEs, often with little 
or no local value added, so that such activities 
contribute little or nothing to the tax base under 
21 Available at http://www.ictd.ac/index.php/unitary-taxation-of-transnational-corporations-with-special-reference-to-developing-
countries 
22 A more detailed presentation is in Picciotto, S. (2016) Taxing Multinationals as Unitary Firms, ICTD Working Paper 53. 
23 This point seems to have been overlooked in the otherwise insightful analysis by the IMF policy paper, which states: ‘Countries 
have an incentive under FA to attract whatever factors are given high weight in the formula’ (IMF (2014: 41) Spillovers in 
International Corporate Taxation, Washington DC: IMF.
24 See Durst, M. (2015) The Tax Policy Outlook for Developing Countries: Reflections on International Formulary Apportionment, 
ICTD Working Paper 32, who also points out that UTWFA would provide MNEs with a high degree of predictability for planning 
investments.
25 Clausing, K. (2014) Lessons for International Tax Reform from the US State Experience under Formulary Apportionment, ICTD 
Research Report 2.
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current rules. Thus, the net effect of a sales basis 
for apportionment for them would depend on the 
balance of exports to imports by MNEs, taking 
account also of whether MNEs responsible for 
imports have a taxable presence in the country. 
These countries should apply the destination 
basis also to sales of services, provided the 
services supplier has a significant business 
presence. Developing countries have been 
disadvantaged by the shift towards a service 
economy, due to the difficulty of taxing profits of 
foreign suppliers of services under current tax 
rules, even though such a claim to tax can be 
justified by the importance for services of close 
relations with clients. On the other hand, they 
would be justified in applying a source basis for 
sales of minerals and hydrocarbons, since these 
are anyway heavily taxed at and after processing 
in the countries of consumption.
The UTWFA approach would allow for a 
balanced formula. Principle and experience 
suggest that it should balance production as well 
as consumption factors. Some have argued that 
UTWFA would result in stronger competition to 
reduce the tax rate, but this would be reduced 
by inclusion of a sales factor, since firms need to 
seek out customers regardless of the tax rate in 
the state of consumption.
Finally, these approaches could be evaluated 
from the perspective of distributive justice, 
both between firms and companies. In this 
connection, Schoueri has recently suggested 
that ‘discussions concerning transfer pricing 
have moved from fair taxation of a taxpayer 
within a given community, i.e. the ability-to-pay 
principle, to the allocation of tax revenues among 
states’.26 In this light, he asserts that formulary 
apportionment contravenes the ability-to-pay 
principle, because ‘no attention is paid to the 
effective income of a given taxpayer compared 
to other taxpayers within the same community’. 
On the contrary, the focus of all unitary taxation 
approaches is very much on the actual income, 
and hence ability to pay, of each MNE. It is 
precisely the insistence on the application of 
inappropriate comparables under the arm’s 
length principle that has allowed MNEs to 
achieve effective tax rates far below those of 
purely national firms, despite their greater ability 
to pay due to generally higher profitability.
The issue of inter-state equity is more difficult, 
and goes to the heart of the question of how 
value is created. It can be suggested that value 
ultimately derives from labour; on the other hand, 
production is valueless unless profits can be 
realised through sales (as Alfred Marshall said, 
supply and demand are like scissor blades, both 
are needed for cutting). Some would suggest that 
capital is also essential, although others would 
respond that it derives from previous labour 
through accumulation. Capital could presumably 
be represented by the inclusion of assets in the 
formula, but from a practical perspective the 
valuation of assets is highly imprecise. Overall, 
it can be argued that distributive justice could 
be achieved by a formula that balances sales 
and labour. The key remaining issue would be 
whether the labour factor would be measured by 
headcount or payroll (costs of remuneration). A 
good case can be made for payroll, which can be 
said to reflect the value created by different types 
of work, but this would clearly disadvantage 
poorer countries. A compromise could be 
effected by weighting the labour factor equally 
between headcount and payroll.27
The central point is that UTWFA directly addresses 
the issue of criteria for apportioning the tax base, 
rather than leaving it to be dealt with ad hoc.
26 Schoueri, L. (2015: 691) ‘Arm’s Length: Beyond the Guidelines of the OECD’, Bulletin for International Taxation 69: 690-716.
27 This was the solution of the European Parliament when it approved the proposal for a Common Consolidated Tax Base in 2012: 
Report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on the proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), A7-0080/201, 28/3/2012. Payroll should also be measured by purchasing power parity to take 
account of national differences in living costs.
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The Current Period of 
Transition 
Regrettably, the BEPS project failed to establish 
a clear and cogent approach to the central issue 
of how to allocate the income of MNEs according 
to their activities and the value added in each 
country. This was evident in the final reports of 
October 2015, which left key issues for further 
work to be done. It was seen most clearly in 
the report on Action 1, which recognised that 
digitalisation of the economy means that MNEs 
have come ‘closer to the economist’s conception 
of a single firm operating in a co-ordinated 
fashion to maximise opportunities in a global 
economy’ (para. 232). Furthermore, it showed 
that digitalisation undermines the concepts 
of residence and source on which traditional 
international tax rules are based (para. 273). It 
identified some far-reaching possible reforms 
to deal with these challenges, including a 
‘substantial rewrite of the rules for attribution of 
profits’ (para. 286). However, this will require 
continuing work over a further five years. At 
the same time, work is taking place on the 
profit split method, which may move towards 
apportionment methodologies, based on value 
chain analysis.
In the meantime, states are taking steps to 
protect their tax base. The UK has enacted a 
Diverted Profits Tax, which aims to dissuade 
MNEs from using some of the more egregious 
tax avoidance structures. Australia is already 
following suit, and similar proposals are being 
considered in other countries, such as Germany. 
Developing countries also can and should design 
suitable strategies to protect source taxation, 
such as withholding taxes on interest and fees 
for services. However, these are blunt measures, 
as they apply on a gross basis rather than on 
net profit, and are more easily passed on to 
consumers.
For the allocation of profits, developing countries 
need above all a method that is clear, simple 
and easy to administer. A comparison can be 
made between the contrasting approaches and 
experiences of India and Brazil. India adopted 
transfer pricing rules based on the OECD 
guidelines in 2001, leading to a total of transfer 
pricing adjustments estimated at about $16 
billion in seven rounds of transfer pricing audits, 
and close to $9 billion in 2007-2008 alone. Not 
surprisingly there was an explosion of conflicts, 
and Indian transfer pricing litigation has been 
estimated to account for 70 per cent of the 
global total, resulting in an estimated backlog 
of 3,000 cases before the tribunals in 2012,28 
and around double that number today.29 This is 
clearly a dysfunctional approach, which benefits 
only tax practitioners. In sharp contrast, Brazil’s 
system of legislatively fixed transfer pricing 
margins results in very few disputes, removing 
the need for expert staff applying subjective 
judgements, and the scope for corruption. 
Setting profit margins by broad industry sector 
is a very broad-brush approach, and the OECD 
considers the method incompatible with the 
arm’s length principle.30
Developing countries clearly need a more 
effective and sustainable approach. With 
these aims in mind, Michael Durst has put 
forward a proposal for a modified version of the 
Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM).31 
Durst’s Modified Net Margin Method would 
28 Supekar, D. and Dhadphale, A. (2012) ‘Indian Tax Tribunal Establishes Special Benches for Transfer Pricing Cases’, Worldwide 
Tax Daily, 16 October 2012.
29 Personal communication from a senior tax appeal judge.
30 Schoueri (Arm’s Length, note 25 above) explains its merits and suggests how it could be modified to be compatible with the 
OECD model, as a ‘rebuttable fixed margin method’.
31 Durst, M. (2016) Developing Country Revenue Mobilisation: A Proposal to Modify the ‘Transactional Net Margin’ Transfer 
Pricing Method, ICTD Working Paper 44.
Su
m
m
a
ry
 B
ri
ef
12
What Have We Learned About International Taxation and Economic Substance?
International Centre for Tax and Development 
at the Institute of Development Studies 
Brighton BN1 9RE, UK 
T +44 (0)1273 606261  F +44 (0)1273 621202  E info@ictd.ac  W www.ictd.ac
Credits
This ICTD Summary Brief was written by Sol Picciotto. Sol Picciotto has taught at the universities of Dar es Salaam 
(1964–68), Warwick (1968–1992) and Lancaster (1992–2007), where he is now emeritus professor. He is the author 
of International Business Taxation (1992) and Regulating Global Corporate Capitalism (2011), several co-authored 
books, and numerous articles on international economic and business law and regulation, as well as state theory. He is 
coordinator of the BEPS Monitoring Group and a Senior Fellow of the ICTD with which he has conducted research on 
international tax.
This is based on the pre-print version of an article published in the Bulletin for International Taxation (2016), vol. 70 no. 12. 
The final copy-edited and formatted version of that article can be accessed here: https://www.ibfd.org/IBFD-Products/
Journal-Articles/Bulletin-for-International-Taxation/collections/bit/html/bit_2016_12_int_1.html.
The ICTD is funded with UK aid from the UK Government and by the Norwegian Government; however, the views expressed 
herein do not necessarily reflect the UK and Norwegian Governments’ official policies. Readers are encouraged to quote and 
reproduce material from the series. In return, ICTD requests due acknowledgment and quotes to be referenced as above.
© Institute of Development Studies, 2017
avoid the need for a detailed audit based on 
functional analysis and attempting to identify 
comparable independent firms, by simply 
establishing a benchmark for the local affiliate’s 
profitability. This would require the local affiliate 
to earn a profit margin in proportion to that of 
the corporate group as a whole. The benchmark 
he suggests is 25 per cent of the group’s rate of 
earnings before tax. This is based on experience 
of attempting to apply the existing TNMM to a 
wide range of distributors, manufacturers and 
service providers, and the fraction is chosen 
to arrive at a profit allocation that could be 
acceptable to both the revenue authority and 
the taxpayer. It would generally prevent the very 
low requirements of income that under current 
practice tend to be ascribed to risk-stripped 
subsidiaries in the course of BEPS planning. 
The suggested method would require a minimum 
level of income, consistent with group-wide 
profitability, even after all payments to related 
parties. This would limit base erosion through 
the use of related-party loans, as well as other 
deductions such as fees and royalties. Such a 
provision could be applied as a safe harbour, 
although to be effective it should not be optional 
for taxpayers.
Amid all these contending approaches, a clearer 
lead is needed on the direction of travel. In the 
absence of a more coherent approach, MNEs 
will be subjected to increasingly conflicting claims 
to tax. If these burdens come to outweigh the 
tax savings from BEPS strategies, MNE senior 
managers might begin to throw their weight 
behind effective reform proposals. Expanding 
participation in the BEPS project to all interested 
states may help to create a basis for a more 
balanced and global perspective.
